More Sweet Than Sour

Washington and New Delhi are inching closer to better ties
America and India will continue to have diplomatic ups and downs, but both countries consider that accommodation is better than confrontation. While Pakistan and Afghanistan are important regionally and internationally, neither Washington nor New Delhi wishes disruption of US-Indian ties because of Islamabad or Kabul. The Obama administration will continue to defer to India's imperatives.

After President Jimmy Carter visited India in 1978, the village of Daulatpur, in the State of Haryana, was renamed Carterpuri. His mother had been based there as a Peace Corps volunteer, and his visit - and gift consisting of a television set - were appreciated. What was not welcomed by the Indian government was Carter's open-microphone slip, perhaps intentionally, that India should be handed "a cold and blunt message" about its nuclear weapons' program.

Today, America's presidents cannot visit foreign villages for security reasons. During his November visit, President Barak Obama's contacts with the residents of Kanpura, Rajasthan, were confined to a six-minute video conference, after which there was little chance of the place being renamed Obamapuri.

It was also unlikely that Obama would either deliver a critical message about India's nuclear weapons or make observations that might disturb bilateral relations-Kashmir and India's involvement in Afghanistan were two topics left off the agenda during talks between the American president and India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

During his election campaign in 2008, Obama told Time magazine that the situation in Kashmir was "a potential tar pit diplomatically," and that his administration would be "working with Pakistan and India to try to resolve [the Kashmir] crisis in a serious way." Predictably, his pronouncement was met with strong-yet unofficial-objections in India.

But on the eve of his India visit, Obama had not taken any action to solve the Kashmir problem, as promised. Instead, Under Secretary of State William Burns said that America views Kashmir as an internal Indian issue, a statement that was well received in New Delhi, but not in Islamabad.

America's stance on Kashmir reflects its approach to India. Spurred by lucrative commercial ties, and engaging powers that are distrustful of China, Washington has avoided offending New Delhi.

The US stance on Kashmir, however, has not always been so detached. In 1951, the US voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 91, which stated that the "final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people, expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite," conducted under the auspices of the UN.

In 1993, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphael said that his country did not "recognize the legal validity of Kashmir's accession as meaning that Kashmir is forever an integral part of India. He argued that the "people of Kashmir have got to be consulted in any kind of final settlement of the Kashmir dispute." Raphael's comments provoked criticism in India.

In December, leaked US diplomatic cables showed US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson arguing, in February 2009, that the resolution of the Kashmir problem would "dramatically improve the situation" in the subcontinent. Her advice was not heeded. Obama made it clear that, in spite of the fact that Kashmir remains on the Security Council's agenda, there would be no attempt to help solve the problem.

Part of Washington's reluctance to uncork the Kashmir bottle is tied to a belief that Pakistan supports terrorism across its eastern border. Those responsible for the killing spree in Mumbai in 2008 came from Pakistan. Allegations that they were officially sponsored by Pakistan, a firm belief in India, have yet to be substantiated.

Terrorism was high on Obama's agenda while in India. His decision to stay in the Taj Mahal Hotel, badly damaged in the 2008 assault, conveyed a message of sorts. In Parliament, Obama received applause during his address when he said that America "will continue to insist to Pakistan's leaders that terrorist safe havens within their borders are unacceptable," and that "terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks must be brought to justice."

Singling out Pakistan caused dismay in Islamabad. This was followed by a Singh statement - on November 21 - that India was "willing to discuss all outstanding issues, provided the terror machine [in Pakistan] is brought under control."

On Afghanistan, Singh said that he was "not sure whether the US and Pakistan have the same objectives. Pakistan would like Afghanistan to be under its control. And they would like the United States to get out soon." Singh added: "We would like to do more for the construction and development of Afghanistan, and [we] believe we can do it more effectively than any other aid donors." Singh was echoing the sentiment of General David Petraeus, the top US commander in Afghanistan, who said in July that India, "without question," has legitimate interests in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, for its part, has major reservations about India's influence in Afghanistan. Although the official Islamabad line on the US-India cooperation has been that "Pakistan hopes the US will take a moral view, and not base itself on any temporary expediency or exigencies of power politics," there is evident souring of Washington-Islamabad relations caused by the Afghan conflict, and especially by what Pakistan views as US-endorsed Indian meddling.

Meanwhile, the US regards Pakistan's stance on Afghanistan as realistic, given its geographic proximity. Yet America does not want to appear to be working contrary to India's strategic policies, which include an uncompromising rejection of international involvement in regional affairs such as Kashmir.

In September, Minister of External Affairs SM Krishna said that India "consistently rejected the whole idea" of assistance from third parties to help resolve the Kashmir dispute. But, as observed by Finland's Foreign Minister, in May, "if a bilateral solution has not been found in 60 years, then perhaps other avenues for a solution should be found."

It appears that the Obama administration will continue molding its approach to India according to New Delhi's priorities. Immediate bilateral economic imperatives are likely to trump long-term "avenues for a solution" in Kashmir. And although Washington will try to accommodate Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan, if only because it would be most unwise to do otherwise, the US will not discourage Indian influence there. New Delhi's involvement in Afghanistan will continue growing, to the frustration of Islamabad.

America and India will continue to have diplomatic ups and downs, but both countries consider that accommodation is better than confrontation. While Pakistan and Afghanistan are important regionally and internationally, neither Washington nor New Delhi wishes disruption of US-Indian ties because of Islamabad or Kabul. The Obama administration will continue to defer to India's imperatives.



Brian Cloughley - Commentator on South Asian affairs. He served as Deputy Head of the UN Mission in Kashmir (1980-82) and Australian Defense Attach?n Pakistan (1988-1994). His website is www.beecluff.com